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Abstract 
The aim of this article is twofold: First, I would like to theoretically contribute to 
Science and Technology Studies, and to Science, Technology and Innovation Stud-
ies, respectively, by introducing a hegemony- and discourse-theoretical inspired 
political economy as an interdisciplinary approach. And second, I shall present 
some tentative empirical analyses of the policy field of nanotechnology. 
Nanotechnology is widely perceived as the key technology of the 21st century. As a 
result, it is becoming increasingly important in many government policies devoted 
to technology. Nanotechnology is supposedly appealing for many actors, since it is 
expected to both produce entirely new materials and revolutionize production 
processes in virtually all industrial branches. Approaching the ‘nano-hype’ from a 
discourse-theoretical perspective, I shall show that nanotechnology is not a definite 
technology, but an empty signifier. This empty signifier provides the basis for an 
encompassing socio-economic project that is kept together only by the signifier it-
self. This “innovation project” creates a link between nanotechnology and the fu-
ture of the industrialised states. It aims, above others, at their reconstruction along 
competitive criteria as ‘competition states’. Hence, I shall locate nanotechnology 
policies within a discursive field of political and economic interests and strategies. 
My theoretical approach highlights the importance of hegemonic struggles for the 
construction of (political) reality. Hegemonic practices shape the discursive struc-
ture, which, in turn provides the strategic-selective conditions for articulation. Ac-
cordingly, policymaking can be described as a rather performative process, which 
uses complex systems of representation to establish a situation of stability and pre-
dictability. Hence, the governance of nanotechnology has to be understood as a 
contradictory battleground, where certain actors try to enforce their interests. 
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“Imagine a single area of scientific discovery with the potential to en-
able a wealth of innovative new technologies across a vast array of 
fields including healthcare, information technology, energy produc-
tion and utilization, homeland security and national defence, biotech-
nology, food and agriculture, aerospace, manufacturing, and envi-
ronmental improvement. Nanoscience (…) has this potential” (Na-
tional Science and Technology Council et al. 2003). 
“the world is about to be rebuilt (…) from the atom up. That means 
tens of trillions of dollars to be spent on everything (…) are all about 
to undergo profound and fundamental change. And as a result, so 
will the socio and economic structure of the world. Nanotechnology 
will shake up just about every business on the planet” (Josh Wolfe, 
quoted in ETC 2005a: 24). 
1 Introduction 
Nanotechnology is perceived as the 
“future technology” (e.g. Wood 2003), 
the “key technology” (c.f. Royal Soci-
ety/ Royal Academy of Engineering 
2004), and “the defining technology 
for the 21st century” (c.f. European 
Commission 2004a). The “nanotech-
revolution” (c.f. ETC 2005b) is de-
clared to have profound economic, eco-
logical and social impacts on almost all 
societies, since it is expected to both 
produce entirely new materials and 
revolutionize production processes in 
virtually all industrial branches. As a 
result, this technology becomes in-
creasingly important in many govern-
ment technology policies. Since the 
Apollo moon programme, no scientific 
research endeavour has received more 
public funding than nanotechnology. 
Apparently, the “biotech century” – 
which according to Rifkin (1998: 1) 
entailed “a technology revolution un-
matched in all history in its power to 
remake ourselves, our institutions, and 
our world” – has been surpassed by the 
“nanotech century” today. 
A new and powerful technology 
emerges these days. But instead of tak-
ing this technological development as 
an inevitable and quasi-natural proc-
ess, this article investigates the con-
struction of the nanotechnology policy 
field and conceptualizes the govern-
ance of technologies as a contradictory 
ground of struggles. The aim is to dis-
entangle the nanotechnology hype and 
to locate nanotechnology policies 
within a discursive field of political and 
economic interests and strategies. Ap-
proaching the “nano-hype” from a he-
gemony- and discourse-theoretical 
perspective, the argumentation shall 
show that nanotechnology is not a 
definite technology, but an empty sig-
nifier and a political project that serves 
certain interests and strategies. It will 
be argued that nanotechnology acts as 
a kind of “carrier force” - as a techno-
socio-political innovation strategy - for 
economic expansion. In addition it 
serves for the reconstruction of the in-
dustrialised states along competitive 
criteria, especially in the advanced in-
dustrialised countries. However, tech-
nological development depends heavily 
on its public acceptance. Affected by 
the negative public perception of ge-
netically modified food, governments 
pursue different strategies to gain ap-
proval for nanotechnology. This article 
focuses on articulations and narratives 
– stories that create meaning and ori-
entation and form views – which con-
stitute the policy field of nanotechnol-
ogy and become hegemonic in regula-
tion and governance of nanotechnol-
ogy. One of the main analytical contri-
butions to the current analyses of 
nanotechnology is to disentangle some 
strategies and interests important to 
understand nanotechnology. This 
should help to advance a socio-political 
analysis of nanotechnology, which in 
current studies is still underempha-
sised. 
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2 Nanotech inside? 
Current analyses of nanotechnology 
within Science and Technology Studies 
(e.g. Glimell/ Fogelberg 2003a; Baird/ 
Schummer 2004, 2005; Baird/ Nord-
mann/ Schummer 2004a; Nordmann 
et al. 2006; Schummer/ Baird 2006) 
struggle with the very definition of the 
term itself. Obviously, the definition of 
nanotechnology is controversially de-
bated (cf. Paschen 2003: 38; Decker/ 
Fiedeler/ Fleischer 2004: 10; Bunde-
samt für Sicherheit in der Information-
stechnik 2007: 15). In fact, it has thus 
far proven impossible to even agree on 
the appropriateness of the term 
nanotechnology: “[A]s the term 
‘nanotechnology’ encompasses such a 
wide range of tools, techniques and 
potential applications, we have found it 
more appropriate to refer to 
‘nanotechnologies’” (Royal Society/ 
Royal Academy of Engineering 2004: 
5), which is defined as follows: 
“Nanotechnologies are the design, 
characterisation, production and ap-
plication of structures, devices and sys-
tems by controlling shape and size at 
nanometre scale“ (ibid.; italics in 
original). Accordingly, nanotechnolo-
gies have to be distinguished from 
“Nanosciences“, “[a]lthough there is no 
sharp distinction between them“ 
(ibid.): “Nanoscience is the study of 
phenomena and manipulation of mate-
rials at atomic, molecular and macro-
molecular scales, where properties dif-
fer significantly from those at a larger 
scale“ (ibid.; italics in original). 
Most definitions of nanotechnology 
refer to the nanoscale, which (usually) 
varies between 1-100 nanometres (10-9 
to 10-7 metre): “A broad (…) definition 
might be the area of science and tech-
nology that is currently evolving at the 
nano-scale“ (Sweet/ Strohm 2006: 
528-529). Glimell and Fogelberg 
(2003b) privilege such a definition as 
well: “Nanotechnology is everything 
that occupies the scale of the nanome-
ter. […] A nanometer technology then 
naturally deals with the issue of how to 
control these molecules, atoms, and 
electrons, and about how this technol-
ogy might be mass produced“ 
(Glimell/Fogelberg 2003b: 19-20; ital-
ics in original). But, even the scale is 
under debate: “The most liberal view of 
nanotechnology encompasses all tech-
nology that operates below the thresh-
old of 1,000 nanometres, or one mi-
cron“ (Feder 2004: 1). However, 
Schummer rejects this definition: 
“Since it applies ubiquitously, the 
nanometer scale is insufficient to de-
fine any particular or new kind of re-
search” (Schummer 2004a: 16). The 
most restricted definitions are those, 
which refer to molecular manufactur-
ing: According to this, nanotechnology 
is “the ability to understand, control, 
and manipulate matter at the level of 
individual atoms and molecules, as 
well as at the ‚supramolecular‘ level, 
involving clusters of molecules. Its goal 
is to create materials, devices, and sys-
tems with essentially new properties 
and functions because of their small 
structure“ (Roco 2004: 890). 
Some researchers are surprised at 
these varying types of approaches to 
nanotechnology: “Given this tempest 
of activity, it seems unusual that a 
common and precise definition of 
“nanotechnology” is difficult to come 
by“ (Sweet/ Strohm 2006: 528). Oth-
ers claim the need for a commonly ac-
cepted definition: “In order to have 
meaningful discourse on the societal 
impact of nanotechnology, we must 
first agree on what we mean by 
nanotechnology” (Theis 2001: 60). 
Hence, the question is why nanotech-
nology is that difficult to define. Some 
scholars think this difficulty arises 
from the fact that many researchers 
just use the label to apply for research 
grants (e.g. Stix 2001: 32; Glimell 
2003: 71; Parr 2003: 6; Khushf 2004: 
33-34). Others argue that it is the very 
“character“ of nanotechnology as an 
“umbrella-“ or “enabling technology“ 
(e.g. Fogelberg 2003: 42; Paschen 
2003: 39). Moreover, for some schol-
ars nanotechnology represents a cul-
ture-historical phenomenon (e.g. 
Baird/ Nordmann/ Schummer 2004b: 
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6; Schiemann 2006). In this article it 
will be argued that the above-
mentioned reasons are not entirely 
mistaken, but they still do not capture 
the main issue, which is at stake. 
The aim to analyse the discursive field 
of nanotechnology is based on the as-
sumption that the definition of what 
nanotechnology entails is controver-
sially debated. Historically, the physi-
cist Richard Feynman is seen as the 
theoretical founder of nanotechnology. 
In his famous speech “There’s plenty of 
room at the bottom” (Feynman 1959), 
Feynman developed the conceptual 
underpinnings of the possibility to ex-
amine, control, and manipulate matter 
at the scale of individual atoms and 
molecules without using the term 
nanotechnology. However, there are 
signs that Feynman was created retro-
spectively as the founder of nanotech-
nology (c.f. Toumey 2005; Nordmann 
2007). The term “nanotechnology” was 
first used by Norio Taniguchi, referring 
to the capacity of precisely engineering 
materials on the nanometre scale (c.f. 
Taniguchi 1974). A breakthrough for 
nanotechnology was the research on 
the scanning tunnel microscope (STM) 
by Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer in 
1981. While at the beginning it was 
only used to visualise molecular struc-
tures, scientists soon discovered that 
this instrument was also applicable to 
move molecules and atoms. In 1990, 
Don Eigler and Erhard Schweizer from 
IBM used a STM to move 35 xenon at-
oms (one at a time!) to write their 
company logo. But it was probably Eric 
Drexler, who popularised the term (c.f. 
Drexler 1986; Drexler/ Peterson/ Per-
gamit 1991; see below). Starting in the 
late 1980s, the term was used by more 
and more people, describing very dif-
ferent applications, processes, and 
fields of research. Interestingly, Drex-
ler himself had a very narrow defini-
tion, defining nanotechnology as the 
“development of nanomachines able to 
build nanomachines and other prod-
ucts with atom-by-atom control (a 
process termed molecular manufac-
turing)” (Drexler 2004: 21; italics in 
original). This narrow framing was 
broadened step by step to the point 
where it became completely blurred: 
“Apart from a characteristic size scale, 
it is difficult to find commonalities“ 
(Royal Society/ Royal Academy of En-
gineering 2004: 5). I argue that the 
power of nanotechnology is partly due 
to its elusive character. Nanotechnol-
ogy is not a definite technology, but an 
“empty signifier” (see below). 
The term nanotechnology encom-
passes fields like nanomaterials, 
nanoelectronics and optoelectronics, 
bio-nanotechnology (incl. nanofood), 
nanomedicine, cosmetics and applica-
tions of information and communica-
tion technologies. Many applications 
and products labelled as nano are al-
ready available on the market. Others 
will probably be available in the near 
future (5-10 years) and some may 
never (or only in the far future) be-
come reality. Only a few examples will 
be mentioned, in order to give an idea 
where the term nanotechnology is ap-
plied today. The first nanotech-labelled 
products appeared in the semiconduc-
tor industry to increase storage densi-
ties on microchips and in the pharma-
ceutical industry to improve drug tar-
geting and diagnostic aids. The bulk of 
today's applications lies in the sphere 
of so-called nanoparticles (like “bucky-
balls” and “nanotubes”). Nanoparticles 
are said to be able to contribute to 
stronger, lighter, cleaner and “smarter” 
surfaces and systems. Therefore, 
nanotechnology is still not creating 
entirely new products but plays its part 
in the enhancement of already existing 
products. “Nanoparticles” are used in a 
wide range of “new” products: for ex-
ample in the form of Titan dioxide and 
Zinc oxide to provide UV protection in 
sun creams; in the manufacture of 
scratchproof glasses; in lacquers and 
paints to provide better protection of 
surfaces against scratching, soiling or 
algae coverage; and in ceramic coat-
ings for stronger solar cells. 
Drawing on post-structuralist ap-
proaches, nanotechnology is conceptu-
alised in this article as an empty signi-
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fier.1 An empty signifier is a signifier 
that has become detached from its pre-
vious particular content. Through 
(strategic) articulations this signifier 
tends to loose its particularity in order 
to become the name of fullness – a 
universality. Thus, an empty signifier 
is a hybrid of a particularity and a uni-
versality. This means, “that the signi-
fier which is emptied in order to as-
sume the representing function will 
always be constitutively inadequate“ 
(Laclau 1996: 40). The empty signifier 
will always be a universality contami-
nated by a particularity, i.e. a tenden-
tially empty signifier – an empty sig-
nifier à venir (cf. Laclau 2000: 304; 
Derrida 1999: 184).  
The signifier nanotechnology denotes a 
universal technology that is able to 
solve the world‘s most pressing prob-
lems: The provision of clean water 
worldwide, the satisfaction of global 
energy needs (with “clean“ solutions), 
the maximisation of agricultural pro-
ductivity, the creation of new jobs etc. 
Hence, nanotechnology can be seen as 
a techno-socio-economical innovation 
strategy – a strategy that offers a tech-
nological solution for socio-political 
problems. While Norio Taniguchi or, 
more probably, Eric Drexler coined the 
term, referring to the capability to pre-
cisely engineer materials on the nano-
metre scale, the term became more and 
more detached from that meaning – it 
became tendentially empty. By empty-
ing the signifier from its “original” 
meaning it was possible to refill the 
term with different contents and asso-
ciate it with other positive connota-
tions, such as the “next industrial revo-
lution”, (economic) wealth, sustainable 
development and knowledge-based 
society. Therefore, an empty signifier 
emerges in the hegemonic process of 
signification. At the same time, it ret-
roactively acts upon the system it de-
notes, establishing a previously non-
existent field. Societal forces struggle 
to launch such signifiers and to fill 
                                                                                                                         
1 Huber (2007: 5) brought forward a simi-
lar argument. 
their content hegemonically: “Society 
generates a whole vocabulary of empty 
signifiers whose temporary signifieds 
are the result of a political competi-
tion“ (Laclau 1996: 35). And to “he-
gemonize something is exactly to carry 
out this filling function“ (ibid: 44). 
The empty signifier nanotechnology is 
intimately connected with the emerg-
ing narrative of the nanotechnology 
industry and the fantastic expectations 
surrounding the nanotechnology mar-
ket. They all construct the narrative of 
a technology that will bring wealth to 
the people and could serve as a com-
petitive advantage in the global strug-
gle for market shares. In almost all ad-
vanced industrialised states, scientists 
and politicians emphasise the myriad 
of possible applications and marvel-
lous benefits that will significantly 
change society. The advocates of 
nanotechnology “need” the broadness 
of the definition in order to construct a 
coherent narrative from very different 
sources. Up to a certain point, other 
technologies like biotechnology or ge-
netic engineering could as well be de-
scribed as empty signifiers, since they 
all invoke(d) a certain universality in 
bringing solutions to pressing societal 
problems. The salient and analytically 
interesting point in describing nano-
technology as an empty signifier is 
twofold: first, it is possible for different 
actors to use the term nanotechnology 
strategically for different purposes, 
since the term is very broad.2 Second, 
it inaugurates a perspective in which 
nanotechnology is perceived as a po-
litical project. Thus, the governance of 
nanotechnology becomes a vibrant ter-
rain, criss-crossed by hegemonic 
struggles. Hence, the analytical contri-
bution at hand is first and foremost 
aiming at the deconstruction of some 
strategies and interests behind that 
“technology“. In addition it tries to ad-
vance a socio-political analysis of 
nanotechnology. 
 
2 I would argue the term is slightly broader 
than e.g. biotechnology. 
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To conclude this chapter, the guiding 
thesis is: nanotechnology is neither a 
definite technology or method, nor an 
array of applications or a research 
field. It rather has to be understood as 
an encompassing political project or, 
more precisely, as different political 
projects that are kept together only by 
the empty signifier itself. To designate 
nanotechnology as a political project 
does by no means suggest that no fun-
damental technological changes take 
place nor that this project will not have 
“real” and “tangible” implications for 
(wo)men and society. Nanotechnology, 
as an ensemble of different technolo-
gies and as a political project, is likely 
to have the potential to radically 
change the material livelihoods of 
many people (cf. Wullweber 2006: 
106-112). Simultaneously, there is no 
one coherent strategy of a certain 
group guiding the nanotech project. 
Quite contrary, there are different in-
terests and, to some extent, conflicting 
strategies competing. In order to be 
able to fully develop this argument, the 
theoretical tools guiding the research 
shall be delineated in the following. 
3 Discourse, hegemony and 
political economy 
The theoretical approach is committed 
to a discourse-theoretical ontology, 
which entails an understanding of sys-
tems of signification and subjectivity as 
importantly constitutive for social real-
ity. Furthermore, the struggle for (po-
litical) hegemony is seen as a key fea-
ture of liberal and pluralistic democra-
cies, and defines the very terrain in 
which a political relation is constituted. 
Finally, the approach draws on the 
heterodox economy. This is to inte-
grate a middle-range theory, which is 
able to capture the importance of capi-
tal accumulation and modes of eco-
nomic regulation for the analysis of 
capitalist societies in general, and for 
the analysis of nanotechnology policies 
in particular. 
 
3.1 Discourse theory 
Post-structuralist authors have empha-
sised the role of discourse as constitu-
tive for politics.3 A discourse can be 
described as the sum of all verbal and 
non-verbal articulations on a particular 
topic, shaping the perception, thinking, 
and action of individuals. Within this 
conception of discourse, language, ac-
tion and meaning are closely con-
nected: “Meaning is learned from, and 
shaped in, instances of use; (…) so 
meaning is very much the product of 
pragmatics“ (Pitkin 1972: 84). Articu-
lation is understood as a “practice es-
tablishing relations among elements 
such that their identity is modified as a 
result of the articulatory practice” (La-
clau/ Mouffe 1985: 105). Thus, a dis-
course is a structure – more precisely 
an entity – which has a significance in 
a social, economic, or political context. 
It can be seen as a relational ensemble 
of signifying sequences, which together 
constitute a more or less coherent 
framework of what can be said or done. 
But discourses are not simply reflec-
tions of these contexts. They rather are 
complex mediations between various 
codes, which assign possible meaning 
to reality (c.f. Gottweis 1998: 31-34). 
Furthermore, a discourse fails to in-
voke a complete closure, since there is 
always something escaping the infinite 
processes of signification - an irreduci-
ble “surplus of meaning” (Laclau/ 
Mouffe 1985: 111).  
Post-structuralist approaches highlight 
the importance of discourse for the 
construction of (political) reality. They 
highlight the constructed nature of ac-
tors in politics and society, and the 
phenomenon of competing, conflicting, 
and often contradictory structures of 
meaning and expression in social and 
political life. The pre-discursive mean-
ing of entities such as institutions, sub-
jects of policymaking, and political 
identities is denied. This is due to the 
reasoning that the notion of a “reality” 
                                                             
3 Sometimes also called “postconstructiv-
ism” (cf. Wehling 2006). 
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with a fixed and pre-discursive mean-
ing fails to recognise the analytical dif-
ference between “being” (lat. esse) and 
“existence” (lat. ens). The (physical) 
“existence” of objects is not dependent 
on their discursive articulation, i.e. ex-
istence extraneous to any meaning. But 
the “being” of objects (their meaning) 
depends on their articulation within 
discourses. Accordingly, there is no 
meaningful “reality” outside the field 
of discursivity. But the “discursive 
character of an object does not, by any 
means, imply putting its existence into 
question” (Laclau/ Mouffe 1990: 82, cf. 
103).  
The “truth” of an event will always be 
the contingent outcome of struggles 
among competing discourses and nar-
ratives, transforming “what is out 
there” into a socially and politically 
relevant concept. The outcome of these 
struggles is contingent, insofar as no 
actor can anticipate the exact results of 
his or her action. However, the “scope 
of possibilities” to determine a dis-
course differs much among the actors. 
Strategic articulations are an impor-
tant part of discourses and can be un-
derstood as an attempt to establish a 
chain of equivalence between different 
discursive elements. According to 
Gottweis (c.f. 1998: 31-34), successful 
articulations bring elements of stability 
and order into what is part of the 
available repertoire of political visions 
and identifications in one's social 
situation. They are modes to organise 
political, scientific, and economic real-
ity. Therefore, an articulation is a ma-
terial and strategic practice that “in-
scribes itself into the texture of the so-
cial and creates or rewrites order by 
drawing from a manifold of discur-
sively available narratives and modes 
of representations” (ibid.: 333). But, it 
is vital to stress the fact that “struc-
tures rarely have a simple, unequivocal 
relation to a single strategy“ (Jessop/ 
Sum 2006: 66). By introducing the ne-
ologism “discourse-organisation“, the 
argumentation intends to characterise 
a relatively stabilised spatio-temporal, 
socio-political and strategic-selective 
structure of a specific society, includ-
ing general concepts and values of so-
cial order. Fordism or neo-liberalism, 
for example, can be described as forms 
of discourse-organisation. A discourse-
organisation is a stabilised set of dis-
courses, where meaning does not float 
freely anymore but is fixed to a great 
extent. Thus, the horizon of possibili-
ties is limited.  
A post-structuralist theorising of 
nanotechnology puts emphasis on 
power struggles and interests, and also 
takes into account contingent-acci-
dental events as constitutive for tech-
nological development. It criticises the 
notion that technological development 
is an inevitable and automatic progress 
of science as well as the assumed pro-
gressive character of scientific devel-
opment. In post-structuralist render-
ing neither the “truth” of nanotechnol-
ogy as the technology of the 21st cen-
tury nor the policy problem “nanotech-
nological risks” or the “high-techno-
logy gap” are simply existent. Rather, 
the question is what constitutes a 
“high-technology”, whose interest does 
this kind of framing serve, and what 
social forces try to articulate such 
tropes. Thus, science and power are 
conceptualised as two strongly inter-
connected phenomena, and the a priori 
existence of stable boundaries between 
economy, politics and science is ques-
tioned. 
3.2 Hegemony 
The question is, whether certain articu-
lations within the nanotechnology dis-
course are able to become hegemonic. 
Hegemonic in the sense that nano-
technology becomes widely accepted as 
a technology producing wealth for the 
society. The conception of hegemony 
used in this article derives from Gram-
sci's approach. For Gramsci hegemony 
means the ability of the ruling groups 
to pursue their interests in such ways, 
that the “ruled“ groups regard these 
interests as common or general inter-
ests. Hegemony is perceived as an ac-
tive consent of the ruled (c.f. Gramsci 
1971: 180-182). (Neo-)Gramscian ap-
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proaches introduce a concept of power 
that primarily rests on the ability to 
universalise the particular interests of 
a group as a socio-economic and politi-
cal structure. A certain group is hege-
monic, and not only dominant, if it 
succeeds to win approval of its author-
ity among members of other societal 
groups. The “ruling groups” have to be 
responsive, at least to a certain degree, 
to the respective interests of other 
groups. Identity of interests can be 
achieved by taking into account the 
interests of other groups in the forma-
tive processes of institutionalization. 
These interests have to be merged, so 
that they become equated with the very 
institutions (c.f. Cox 1996: 99-100). 
From a post-structuralist point of view, 
the concepts of discourse and hegem-
ony are inextricably linked and mutu-
ally conditioned. Hegemonic practice 
shapes discourse, which in turn pro-
vides the conditions of possibility for 
hegemonic articulation (c.f. Mouffe 
1979: 179). Framed like this, hegemony 
is a type of social relation. It can be 
described as the widening of a particu-
lar discourse – in the form of a socio-
political project – towards a certain 
horizon of social orientation and ac-
tion, i.e. a discourse-organisation, 
through the articulation of unfixed 
elements into partially fixed moments. 
The ambit and the horizon of a particu-
lar discourse-organisation are consti-
tuted by the exclusion of competing 
discursive elements (“social antago-
nisms”). The exclusion of alternative 
articulations into a discursive “exteri-
ority” is the substantial element of 
hegemonic practices of articulation. 
The organisation of a hegemonic dis-
course depends on its coherence to 
provide a surface of inscriptions for a 
wide range of wants, meanings, inter-
ests, and beliefs. “The fact, that one 
discursive formation gains influence 
over another, that it becomes hege-
monic, is related to the degree of con-
gruence and complementarity that this 
discursive formation has within a given 
discursive constellation” (Gottweis 
1998: 36; italics in original). 
To be successful, i.e. to become hege-
monic, a socio-political project has to 
be articulated in relation to the (imagi-
nary) common good. Since the com-
mon good only exists as an imaginary 
common good, and hence as an empty 
place, there are only particular inter-
ests, which try to occupy this empty 
space through strategic articulations 
(cf. Jessop 2007: 11). Thus, a hege-
monic project has to be articulated in a 
specific way: In these processes of ar-
ticulation a multiplicity of subjects, 
actors, and relevant forces do not only 
act on the assumption that the imple-
mentation of the project is a prerequi-
site to achieve the common good, but 
adopt precise positions, which are pro-
vided through the hegemonic project. 
Three general requirements have to be 
achieved in this regard: First, there is 
the need for an empty signifier, since 
every socio-political project requires a 
signifier, as a medium of representa-
tion. And, as stated above, an empty 
signifier “unifies a given field, consti-
tutes its identity: it is, so to speak, the 
word to which ‘things‘ themselves refer 
to recognize themselves in their unity” 
(Žižek 1989: 95-96). Secondly, the 
empty signifier has to have a positive 
connotation within the discourse in 
question. It has to hold a privileged 
relation vis-à-vis the common good. At 
the same time, alternatives to the 
hegemonic project have to be pre-
sented as unimaginable and unrealiz-
able. And thirdly, the discourse pro-
moted by the hegemonic project has to 
be relevant for society. Hence, the 
analysis of the hegemonic discourse-
organisation and the analysis of the 
overall socio-political context is essen-
tial for the evaluation of a hegemonic 
project.  
3.3 The “competition state“ 
Many studies have explored the altera-
tions of the state in the era of globalisa-
tion. Almost all analyses share the no-
tion that the form and structure of the 
state changed since the 1970s (e.g. 
Lipietz 1987; Wood 1997; Jessop 
2007). In this context, the notion of 
the internationalisation of the state 
 
Wullweber: Nanotechnology – An Empty Signifier à venir? 35 
 
refers to different and often contradic-
tory policy answers within the state 
apparatuses to handle this new situa-
tion. It will be argued, that the hege-
monic discourse to reconstruct the 
state in the advanced industrialised 
countries is one, that emphasises a 
state that has to become streamlined 
along competitive criteria; and that 
nanotechnology plays an important 
role in supporting this discourse.  
Jessop (c.f. 1990) emphasises that the 
state is not a pre-given structure but a 
precarious social relation whose unity 
has to be actively constructed and 
maintained permanently. Further-
more, the state is characterised by stra-
tegic selectivity, insofar as “the state is 
not equally accessible to all social 
forces, cannot be controlled or resisted 
to the same extent by all strategies, and 
is not equally available for all pur-
poses” (Jessop 1990: 317). The state 
can be seen as a battleground – a ma-
trix – for struggles over political he-
gemony in terms of competing defini-
tions of the common interest. Within 
this process of permanent reconstruc-
tion, technological policies, trade poli-
cies, and social policies are all mutually 
reinforcing discursive practices: “The 
articulation of (…) discoursive-strat-
egic shifts into new accumulation strat-
egies, state projects and hegemonic 
projects, and their capacity to mobilize 
support are shaping the restructuring 
and reorientation of the contemporary 
state and helping to produce new regu-
latory regimes” (Jessop 2002: 133). 
However, the attempt to organise ac-
tors, articulations, and meanings is 
usually only temporarily successful. 
The guiding argument is, that the rise 
of nanotechnology is strongly con-
nected to the development of certain 
tendencies that streamline state poli-
cies along allegedly competitive fac-
tors. The congealed form of these 
paradigms of competitiveness will be 
described as the discourse-organisa-
tion of a “competition state”. A compe-
tition state can be identified as a dis-
course-organisation, insofar as it con-
sists of a variety of different discourses 
that have been articulated in and 
through hegemonic practices. Interna-
tional competition has become impor-
tant. Today, states are placed on the 
sliding scale of a global competitive 
indicator on the basis of their assumed 
competitiveness (ibid.: 119-120). 
The discourse-organisation of the 
competition state frames a state aim-
ing to secure economic growth within 
its borders, while ensuring competitive 
advantages for capital on its territory. 
This can be achieved by promoting the 
economic and extra-economic condi-
tions that are perceived vital for suc-
cess. It emphasises strategies to create, 
restructure or reinforce the competi-
tive advantages of its territory, popula-
tion, social institutions and economic 
agents. This discourse-organisation 
highlights certain characteristics that 
can be depicted as “Schumpeterian”, 
“because of its concern with techno-
logical change, innovation and enter-
prise and its attempt to develop tech-
niques of government and governance 
to these ends“ (ibid.: 96). For Joseph 
Schumpeter, entrepreneurial innova-
tion can proceed in different ways (cf. 
Lim 1990): via the introduction of a 
new good or a new quality of a good, 
via the introduction of a new method 
of production, via the opening of a new 
market, via the conquest of a new 
source of supply of raw materials or 
half-manufactured goods, and via the 
implementation of the new organisa-
tion of any industry. This approach 
highlights a prevailing thought of how 
society should be restructured in the 
light of a paradigm of innovation and 
competition. As it will be argued be-
low, this narrative creates a link be-
tween nanotechnology and the indus-
trial future of the advanced industrial-
ised states. The notion of the competi-
tion state also has to be applied to 
competitive regions like the European 
Union. 
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4 Nanotech – a techno-socio-
economical innovation 
strategy 
The actual “nano-hype” plays an im-
portant role for the political contextu-
alisation of nanotechnology in general, 
and for the present analysis in particu-
lar. “[F]or now the products seem rela-
tively modest compared to the preced-
ing hype” (Arnall 2003: 2). As the U.S. 
National Initiative (2003) states, 
“nanotechnology has the potential to 
profoundly change our economy, to 
improve our standard of living, and to 
bring about the next industrial revolu-
tion.” It is suggested that nanotechnol-
ogy is at approximately the same stage 
of development today as information 
technology was in the early 1960s, or 
biotechnology was at the beginning of 
the 1980s (c.f. Department of Trade 
and Industry 2002). 
Both scientists and politicians promise 
revolutionary breakthroughs generated 
by nanotechnology: new ways of detec-
tion and treatment of diseases, in drug 
development, in the monitoring and 
protection of the environment (e.g. wa-
ter decontamination), in the produc-
tion and storage of energy, or in en-
hanced information and communica-
tion technologies. In their view, 
nanotechnology will enable to build 
complex structures as small as an elec-
tronic circuit or as large as an aero-
plane, and produce stronger and 
lighter material (c.f. Royal Society/ 
Royal Academy of Engineering 2004: 
1; Department of Trade and Industry 
2002). Nanotechnology is perceived as 
an instrument to make powerful in-
formation technology available every-
where, to maximise productivity in ag-
riculture, to increase health and lon-
gevity of human life, to provide abun-
dant clean water globally, and to meet 
global energy needs with clean solu-
tions.4
                                                             
4 See for example Foresight Nanotechnol-
ogy Challenges (URL: http://www.fore 
sight.org/challenges/index.html; last view 
8 May 2008). 
To understand the nanotechnology 
hype, one also has to take into account 
the most utopian expectations for fu-
ture applications of nanotechnology. 
According to these visions, the most 
promising applications will stem from 
processes called “self-assembly” or 
“molecular manufacturing”. Self-
assembly refers to the tendency that 
some materials are spontaneously 
“able” to arrange themselves into or-
dered structures (c.f. Antón/ Silber-
glitt/ Schneider 2001). The goal and 
aspiration is to build desired structures 
from atomic scratch. The idea is not 
only to manufacture individual parti-
cles with useful properties, but to 
manufacture complex and useful struc-
tures made from multiple molecules. 
Hence, the desired outcome of nano-
technology is the manipulation and 
assembly of nanoscale particles into 
supramolecular constructions and even 
larger structures. Some scientists 
(most notably the controversial person 
of Eric Drexler) believe that one day 
molecular manufacturing will be pos-
sible, i.e. to control atomic positioning 
so precisely that any object whose 
atomic composition is known could be 
assembled from its basic units (Drexler 
1986, 2001).  
4.1 The nanotechnology market 
In the following, it will be argued that 
the nanotechnology discourse is sup-
ported by different strategies, specified 
as the narrative of the nanotechnology 
market, the narrative of the knowl-
edge-based economy, and the narrative 
of the nanotech-race. Economic inter-
est in nanotechnology is not automati-
cally given. Rather the interest itself is 
socially constructed and serves certain 
strategies. After years of basic research 
it is still uncertain if nanotechnology 
will produce substantial goods for the 
market. Nevertheless, there are count-
less studies that assess the possible 
impact of nanotechnology for future 
markets. Some sources state that by 
2012 the entire market will be depend-
ent on nanotech (c.f. Arnall 2003: 22). 
Although there are still only a few 
nanotechnology products on the mar-
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ket, growth is expected to be strong, 
with a composite annual growth rate of 
30–40% (c.f. Department of Trade and 
Industry 2002). The market confi-
dence in nanotechnology is reflected by 
a number of forecasts. Miles and Jarvis 
(c.f. 2001) assess the market for 
nanotechnology-based IT and elec-
tronic devices at around US$70 billion 
by 2010. Roco and Bainbridge (c.f. 
2001: 11) argue that nanotechnology 
will bear an annual production of 
about US$300 billion for the semicon-
ductor industry, and about the same 
amount for global integrated circuits 
sales within 10–15 years. For micro- 
and nanotechnology systems in the 
telecommunications sector, the market 
is presently estimated around an 
amount of US$35 billion with an an-
ticipated compound annual growth 
rate of around 70% (c.f. Arnall 2003: 
22). The U.S. National Science Foun-
dation (NSF) has predicted that the 
market for nanotechnology products 
will exceed US$1 trillion by 2015 (c.f. 
Royal Society/ Royal Academy of En-
gineering 2004: 1). In 2004, the NSF 
revised its forecast, estimating that the 
US$1 trillion market would come and 
go in 2011 (c.f. ETC 2005b: 6). 
These immense expectations create an 
image of future markets, which is only 
achievable if the industry branches 
move up the technological ladder and 
align their R&D policies with the nano-
scale. For this reason all advanced in-
dustrialised countries, almost all For-
tune 500 companies and two-thirds of 
the companies in the Dow Jones In-
dustrial Average, convey nanotech re-
search, development, and investment 
in some way. The technological compe-
tence in nanotechnology is allegedly a 
compulsory condition to compete suc-
cessfully with better procedures and 
products on future markets. At the 
same time, a view becomes hegemonic 
that does not permit any alternative to 
the development of nanotechnology, 
since the nations which fall behind will 
miss the junction to the future mar-
kets. Hence, nanotechnology becomes 
a synonym for innovation within the 
competition states. As nano-materials 
and -processes apply to many manu-
factured goods, in almost all industry 
sectors, control and ownership of 
nanotechnology is decisive for virtually 
all governments and for the competi-
tiveness of industry: In terms of at-
tracting initial investment, and to en-
sure future revenue. With certain pat-
ents it will be possible to control com-
plete chains of production: “Don’t bet 
the jockey. Don’t bet the horse. Own 
the track” (Lux Research 2004: 186). 
Apparently, nanotechnology is the first 
research field in which the basic ideas 
and applications are patented from the 
outset: the most basic ideas and fun-
damental building blocks in nanotech-
nology “are either already patented or 
may well end up being patented” (ETC 
2005b: 10). Hence, intellectual prop-
erty rights are a key element in both, 
the knowledge-based economy and the 
global competitive struggle for (global) 
market shares, since “companies that 
hold pioneering patents could poten-
tially put up tolls on entire industries” 
(Regalado 2004: 1). The “race” for the 
nanotechnology patent “gold rush” 
(ETC 2003: 24) has started among 
TNCs, leading academic labs, start-ups 
and universities.  
4.2 The narrative of the knowl-
edge-based economy 
One feature of capitalist developments 
is the permanent process of primitive 
accumulation: the transformation of 
formerly “common good” into private 
property, the separation of producer 
and means of production, and the crea-
tion and enforcement of capitalist rela-
tions of production (c.f. Marx 2001: 
741-791). The material (and often vio-
lent) process of primitive accumulation 
is mediated and backed up by an array 
of discourses. Within the competition 
state, the process of primitive accumu-
lation refers more systematically and 
accentuated than before to knowledge 
and its commodification and privatisa-
tion (for the relation between primitive 
accumulation, genetic ressources and 
traditional knowledge see Wullweber 
2004). Apparently, the factor “knowl-
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edge” is getting more important for 
international competitiveness: “To cre-
ate wealth and new employment in a 
globalised market and within a knowl-
edge-based economy, the competitive 
production of new knowledge is essen-
tial” (European Commission 2004b: 
9). Jessop (c.f. 2002: 96) describes the 
contemporary era, generally as a 
knowledge-based economy (KBE). The 
notion of the KBE can be conceived as 
a narrative within the discourse-
organisation of the competition state 
supporting and articulating today's 
process of primitive accumulation. The 
KBE is the widely taken-for-granted 
focal point of accumulation strategies, 
state projects, and hegemonic visions. 
It is a nodal point, a privileged discur-
sive point that partially fixes meaning 
within signifying chains (c.f. Laclau/ 
Mouffe 1985: 112). 
The nanotechnology discourse concurs 
with the issue of knowledge generation 
and the narrative of the knowledge-
based economy in policy speeches, 
documents, and programmes. Philippe 
Busquin, European Commissioner for 
Research, states that “nanotechnology 
provides a golden opportunity for the 
creation of new knowledge-based en-
terprises and has a 'revolutionary' po-
tential that can open up new produc-
tion routes” (European Commission 
2004b: 1). Likewise, the EU Commis-
sion declares on its research home-
page: “Nanosciences and nanotech-
nologies are crucial to the establish-
ment of a knowledge-based EU society 
and economy” (European Commission 
2004c). According to this logic, “Eu-
rope must (…) transform its world-
class R&D in N&N [Nanosciences and 
Nanotechnologies] into useful wealth-
generating products in line with the 
actions for growth and jobs” (Commis-
sion of the European Communities 
2005: 2). Together these narratives 
frame nanotechnology as a competitive 
advantage for the industrialised coun-
tries. 
 
4.3 International competition 
and the “nanotech-race” 
Nanotechnology is framed discursively 
as a technology that is the pre-eminent 
factor for achieving a nation's innova-
tion: It does not only introduce new 
goods but also offers a new quality of 
goods, it ushers new methods of pro-
duction, it opens up new markets. And 
finally, it offers a new source of supply 
of raw materials. Nanotechnology is 
preordained as the magic tool leading 
to the production of ever smaller, 
faster and more efficient products with 
acceptable price-to-performance ratio. 
This has become an increasingly im-
portant success factor for many indus-
trial branches in international compe-
tition. 
Thus, the empty signifier nanotechnol-
ogy serves as a techno-socio-econo-
mical innovation strategy. The U.S. 
National Science and Technology 
Council states (2003: 3): “Because 
nanotechnology is of such critical im-
portance to U.S. competitiveness, both 
economically and technologically, even 
at this early stage of development, it is 
a top priority within the Administra-
tion's R&D agenda”. In a similar way, 
the European Commission argues: 
“Advances across a wide range of sec-
tors are being enabled through R&D 
and innovation in N&N [Nanotechnol-
ogy&Nanoscience]. These advances 
can address the needs of citizens and 
contribute to the Union’s competitive-
ness and sustainable development ob-
jectives and many of its policies includ-
ing public health, employment and oc-
cupational safety and health, informa-
tion society, energy, transport, security 
and space” (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities 2005: 2). 
The ascription to nanotechnology of 
being an innovation, and hence a com-
petitive advantage, gives rise to an 
enormous global nanotechnology race 
among the industrialised nations. Ap-
parently, the race is on to win monop-
oly control over the expected huge 
nanotechnology market and to win a 
share of the 2 mio. nanotechnology 
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workers, which are said to be required 
by the nanotechnology industry (c.f. 
Roco 2003). Between 1997 and 2006, 
government’s investment in nanotech 
R&D increased from 432 million US$ 
to about 4681 million US$ a year (c.f. 
Roco 2007: 30). In 2007, industry and 
governments invested an estimated 
13,9 billion US$ in nanotech R&D 
worldwide. In 2009, the U.S. funding 
for nanotechnology will grow to a sum 
of 1527 million (cf. National Nano-
technology Advisory Panel 2008: 9). 
The “nanotech-race” is now at centre 
stage of many government science and 
technology policies. 
States play a crucial role in promoting 
innovative capacities, technical compe-
tence, and technology transfer. They 
hope that as many corporations and 
economic sectors as possible may 
benefit from the assumed new techno-
logical opportunities created by nano-
technology R&D activities. Within this 
competitive climate, the “systematic 
generation of science and technology 
(…) becomes an important area of the 
functions of the state administration” 
(Hirsch 1978: 94). The nanotechnology 
discourse, combined with the narra-
tives of the nanotech-race and of a 
knowledge-based economy, supports 
the (re-)construction of the competi-
tion state. The competition state has to 
“focus upon (…) knowledge-based in-
dustrial innovation ('nanomanufactur-
ing'), integration at the macro-micro-
nano interface and interdisciplinary 
('converging') R&D. Appropriate syn-
ergy with the European Strategy on 
Life Sciences and Biotechnology may 
also be beneficial” (European Commis-
sion 2004b: 8). 
However, a nanotech-race is not sim-
ply existent. Rather, the creation of the 
narrative of a nanotech-race is the out-
come of constitutive practices and 
hegemonic struggles. The actors within 
the nanotech-race are not acting inde-
pendently from the different dis-
courses, which in many ways have an 
influence on how these actors view the 
world, define their goals, and structure 
their actions. The perception of “a 
highly competitive global economy” 
(Her Majesty‘s Government 2005: 1), 
and the prevailing analysis that only 
those nations thrive “that can compete 
on high technology and intellectual 
strength” (ibid.), supports the narra-
tive of the nanotech-race to become 
hegemonic. 
5 Public acceptance – 
nanotechnology without an-
tagonism? 
As stated above, the success of a hege-
monic project depends heavily on its 
public acceptance. Thus, the “public 
trust and acceptance of nanotechnol-
ogy will be crucial for its long-term de-
velopment” (European Commission 
2004b: 19). Advocates of nanotechnol-
ogy have to win the “perception wars” 
(Mitsch/ Mitchell 1999) to become 
hegemonic. In the field of GM-food, 
governments have already experienced 
that the governance of high technology 
is difficult. In the 1990s, GM-foods 
were value-detracted instead of value-
added and the “perception wars are 
being lost by industry, one battle after 
another” (ibid.). Governments appar-
ently try to pursue new strategies to 
avoid “another backlash like the one 
over genetically modified foods” (Boyd 
2003) for nanotechnology. In my on-
going empirical research (cf. Wullwe-
ber forthcoming), I have identified 
several hegemonic stratagems5: a) ar-
ticulation of the empty signifier; b) su-
per-differential border-drawing; c) ar-
ticulation of equivalence of different 
demands; d) legitimate difference; e) 
antagonistic division of the discourse; 
and f) expansion of the chain of 
equivalence. So far, the different strat-
egies seem to be successful, since the 
resistance to nanotechnology is by no 
means as strong as e.g. the anti-GMO 
protests. In the following, the strata-
                                                             
5 The term “stratagem“ denotes a generic 
term for different strategies that show 
“family resemblance“ (Wittgenstein; cf. 
Nonhoff 2006: 207-240). 
 
40 STI Studies 2008: 27-45 
 
gem of “legitimate difference” will be 
shortly discussed. 
Generally, the stratagem of “legitimate 
difference“ aims to integrate poten-
tially antagonistic positions into the 
hegemonic chain of equivalence. Po-
tentially antagonistic demands become 
simple contradictions – legitimate dif-
ferences – within the hegemonic pro-
ject. These strategies strengthen the 
hegemonic project, because it can be 
indicated that critical actors are not 
only heard, but that they are part of the 
project in question. Their potential to 
mobilise critical societal forces is 
bound. Furthermore, a broader audi-
ence is addressed. The unit “Nano- and 
Converging Sciences and Technolo-
gies“ of the EU-Commission declared: 
“It could be useful to involve powerful 
NGOs (for example Greenpeace) to 
attract a broader audience to dialogue“ 
(Bonazzi 2007: 26). However, it is not 
about a one-sided integration: By in-
volving certain positions and actors, 
the hegemonic project itself will be 
transformed to a certain degree. 
The majority of people in the advanced 
industrialised states do not as yet have 
much knowledge about nanotechnol-
ogy (for Europe cf. Eurobarometer 
2006; Bundesinstitut für Risikobewer-
tung 2007; for the USA cf. Priest 2006: 
565; Kahan 2007). This poses a prob-
lem for protagonists of nanotechnol-
ogy, because “[w]ithout a serious 
communication effort, nanotechnology 
innovations could face an unjust nega-
tive public reception” (European 
Commission 2004b: 19). With regard 
to genetic engineering “the lack of suf-
ficient public scientific data on GMOs, 
whether positive or negative, was a 
controlling factor in the industry's fall 
from favour. The failure of the industry 
to produce and share information with 
public stakeholders left it ill-equipped 
to respond to GMO detractors“ (Colvin 
2003). Thus, advocates of nanotech-
nology start public debates, because 
“an open public dialogue with citizens 
and consumers is absolutely necessary 
as a basis for an objective judgement 
on nanotechnology and to avoid base-
less fears” (Luther 2004: 94). 
Many “nano-dialogues” are launched 
in countries, which run nanotechnol-
ogy programmes. In 2005, a European 
Commission-funded project “Nano-
logue” was launched to address a 
Europe-wide dialogue on benefits, 
risks and social, ethical and legal im-
plications of nanotechnology (cf. 
Nanologue 2005). In 2006, the Euro-
pean Communication Project “Nano-
dialogue - Enhancing dialogue on 
Nanotechnologies and Nanosciences in 
society at the European level“ was in-
augurated (cf. www.nanodialogue.org). 
A communication tool called “Decide – 
Deliberative Citizens Debate“ has since 
been developed (cf. http://www.play 
decide.org/). Furthermore, different 
citizen panels were organised: the so-
called “NanoJury UK“ in Great Britain 
(cf. Greenpeace 2005), a “consumer 
conference“ in Germany (cf. Bundesin-
stitut für Risikobewertung 2006), the 
“Citizen Consensus Conference on 
Nanotechnology“ in Wisconsin/USA 
(cf. Kleinman 2005) and others, for 
example in France, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Finland. However, 
these dialogues are obviously re-
stricted. They are “open” as long as 
they address “baseless” fears and con-
struct an “objective”, and, hence, posi-
tive judgement of nanotechnology. 
Critical recommendations are usually 
ignored, because they shall not slow 
down the process of technological de-
velopment, but rather “reduce misun-
derstanding and obstruction” (Boyd 
2003). Apparently, the overall goal of 
all these programmes is not to discuss 
possible problems but to achieve ac-
ceptance for nanotechnological devel-
opment.6 Not the risk of nanotechnol-
                                                             
6 In contrast, Schummer (2004b: 56) pro-
vides a more positive analysis of the cur-
rent nano-dialogue: “That appears to be a 
great opportunity for cultural and social 
scientists to engage in partnership models 
with scientists and engineers such that 
both groups can immensely benefit from 
each other, for the overall benefit of the 
society.”  
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ogy is at stake but its “smooth” devel-
opment. Hans Kastenholz of the Swiss 
Federal Laboratories of Material Test-
ing and Research, which is part of the 
Nanologue, states: “Consumer accep-
tance will be key for nanotechnology’s 
future development and thus key for 
financial markets and venture capital-
ists. [...] Engaging society in a dialogue 
about the opportunities and potential 
risks will address and help to mitigate 
some of these uncertainties surround-
ing the issue” (Nanologue 2005). Nev-
ertheless, this stratagem already pro-
duces lacks in the discursive structure: 
In January 2008, the Soil Association, 
the biggest organic certifier in Great 
Britain, declared to ban human-made 
nanomaterials from all organic cos-
metics, foods and textiles that it certi-
fies. For the past few years, the Soil 
Association has been part of a working-
group on an industry labelling scheme, 
but it has been very unhappy with the 
reluctant government policies concern-
ing risk regulations: “We are deeply 
concerned at the government’s failure 
to follow scientific advice and regulate 
products. There should be an immedi-
ate freeze on the commercial release of 
nanomaterials until there is a sound 
body of scientific research into all the 
health impacts. As we saw with GM, 
the government is ignoring the initial 
indications of risk and giving the bene-
fit of the doubt to commercial interest 
rather than the protection of human 
health“ (Soil Association 2008). It may 
be a question of time, until resistance 
to nanotechnology will grow stronger – 
is this an antagonism à venir? 
6 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was twofold: In a 
first step, tentative and explorative 
thoughts on an interdisciplinary he-
gemony- and discourse-theoretical 
inspired political economy approach 
have been delineated. In a second step, 
this theoretical matrix has been ap-
plied - still cautiously and exemplarily 
- to the policy field of nanotechnology. 
The theoretical approach provides a 
different perspective on the develop-
ment of nanotechnology. While most 
of the current analyses treat nanotech-
nology as a definite technology, my 
thesis is that the term nanotechnology 
denotes an encompassing political pro-
ject - a techno-socio-economical inno-
vation strategy, that is kept together 
only by the empty signifier itself. Thus, 
a perspective is inaugurated that facili-
tates to delineate political interests and 
strategies within the process of nano-
technology development. Furthermore, 
it is possible to expound different dis-
courses and policy narratives that have 
been associated with the nanotechnol-
ogy discourse. While the discourse of 
international competition is fostered 
through the trope of the ongoing 
nanotechnology race, nanotechnology 
itself is presented as one of the most 
important strategies of innovation to 
win the battle for global market shares. 
To become hegemonic, a certain con-
vergence of discursive elements is nec-
essary. The success of the nanotech-
nology project derives from an align-
ment with the discourse-organisation 
of the competition state in general and 
the narratives of the knowledge-based 
economy, the nanotech-race and the 
immense future markets for nanotech-
nology. These discourses are mutually 
reinforcing and strengthening. 
To a large extent, the development of 
nanotechnology is shaped by govern-
mental technology policies (even 
though private actors become more 
and more important). Today, these 
policies are predominantly character-
ised by an accelerating commercialisa-
tion. From this perspective, nanotech-
nology is the pre-eminent factor for 
achieving innovation and competitive 
advantages: It introduces new goods 
and offers a new quality of goods, it 
ushers new methods of production, it 
opens new markets, and, it offers a 
new source of supply of raw materials. 
However, the enforcement of new 
technologies is no automatic, self-
evident process. It rather is embedded 
in social relations and has to be backed 
by political measures. Nanotechnology 
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has to be embedded in modified gov-
ernance structures, which currently 
materialise in the political form of the 
competition state. For this new mode 
of socio-economic regulation the “con-
sent of the ruled” is required. Regard-
ing nanotechnology, different strate-
gies are performed to win the concur-
rent “perception wars”. Nanotechnol-
ogy advocates in governments must 
pursue policies supporting a positive 
climate for business and a favourable 
public perception. Therefore, they try 
to invoke different discursive elements 
in order to strengthen the perception 
that nanotechnology is indispensable 
for an economically viable society. 
While the future for the nanotechnol-
ogy project is still uncertain, the policy 
field remains challenging. 
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